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Key points 
This paper examines the provisions for bail-in – that is, the principle whereby any public measure to 
recapitalise a bank with insufficient prudential capital must be preceded by a write-down or conversion into 
equity of creditors’ claims – in EU state aid policies and the new resolution framework for failing banks, 
with two aims: 
i) to assess whether and how they are coordinated and  
ii) more importantly, whether they address satisfactorily the question of systemic stability that may arise 
when investors fear that creditor claims are likely to be bailed-in in a bank crisis.  
The issue is especially relevant in the present context, as the comprehensive assessment exercise underway 
for EU banks falling under the direct supervision of the European Central Bank may lead supervisors to 
require substantial capital injections simultaneously for many of the banks involved, possibly shaking 
investors’ confidence across EU banking markets.      
Recommendations 
The authors conclude that the two sets of rules are, broadly speaking, mutually consistent and that they 
already contain sufficient safeguards to address systemic stability concerns. However, the balance of the 
elements underpinning the European Commission’s decisions in individual cases may not be clear to bank 
creditors and potential investors in financial markets. The impression of unneeded rigidity on this very 
sensitive issue has been heightened by official statements over-emphasising that each case will be assessed 
individually under competition rules, thus feeding the concern that the systemic dimension of the issue may 
have been underestimated. Therefore, further clarification by the Commission may be needed on how the 
various criteria will be applied during the ongoing transition to banking union – perhaps through a new 
communication completing the state aid framework for banks in view of the adoption of the new resolution 
rules.
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1. Introduction 
In July 2013, the European Commission adopted 
a new Banking Communication – the seventh 
since the start of the financial crisis – updating 
its criteria for the evaluation of state aid in the 
banking sector in response to the evolving 
economic and institutional environment.1 Under 
this Communication, any credit institution in 
need of recapitalisation or ‘impaired asset’ 
measures will be required, prior to any further 
action, to submit a plan for restructuring or the 
orderly winding down the bank. Moreover, 
whenever there is a capital shortfall, the 
Commission will require that, prior to any 
injection of public funds, not only shareholders 
– as has been the case so far – but also junior 
creditors write down or convert into equity their 
claims on the bank, regardless of whether the 
bank is under resolution, in order to minimise 
the need for state aid. 
Subsequently, the Council and the European 
Parliament have adopted a directive (BRRD)2 
and a regulation (SRR) 3  establishing uniform 
rules for the resolution of banks. For member 
states participating in the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM), these rules will be applied 
                                                     
1  Communication from the Commission on the 
application from 1 August 2013 of State aid rules to 
support measures in favour of banks in the context of 
the financial crisis (“Banking Communication”) (2013/C 
216/01), 30 July 2013.  
2 Directive of the European Parliament and the Council 
establishing a framework for the recovery and 
resolution of credit institutions and investment firms 
and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and 
Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 
2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU 
and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 
and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and 
of the Council PE-CONS, 24 April 2014.  
3 Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council establishing uniform rules and a 
uniform procedure for the resolution of credit 
institutions and certain investment firms in the 
framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a 
Single Bank Resolution Fund and amending Regulation 
(EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council (COM(2013)0520 – C7-0223/2013 – 
2013/0253(COD)), 15 April 2014. 
within the SRM, which will be supported by a 
Single Resolution Fund (SRF). Both the BRRD 
and the SRR contain rules for the bail-in of 
shareholders and creditors, either on a stand-
alone basis or as a part of the resolution 
procedure. The adoption under the BRRD or the 
SRR of a resolution scheme entailing state aid or 
resort to the SRF is made conditional on the 
approval of the public support by the European 
Commission, under state aid rules.  
The pre-conditions and the scope of burden-
sharing by creditors under state aid control and 
resolution procedures do not coincide. 
Therefore, there is a need to ascertain whether 
the coordination of the two sets of rules is 
adequate. In addition, questions have been 
raised as to whether the guidelines on state aid 
to banks take sufficient account of systemic 
stability considerations when imposing the 
conversion or write-down of creditor claims.  
The issue has assumed special relevance in 
connection with the ongoing comprehensive 
assessment of the quality of banks’ balance 
sheets and business models by the European 
Central Bank (ECB), in preparation for the start 
of the SSM, which may require substantial 
capital injections to meet the enhanced 
prudential requirements, and possibly public 
support in certain cases. As may be recalled, the 
publication of the new Banking Communication 
in July 2013 led to a lively exchange of letters 
between Commissioner Joaquin Almunia and 
ECB President Mario Draghi (the letters were 
leaked to the press but never officially 
published). Mr Draghi reportedly feared that 
the Commission Communication could be read 
as the announcement that all banks in need of 
public support would be preventively subject to 
a bail-in of junior creditors, regardless of 
circumstances, potentially aggravating the 
funding difficulties of individual banks and the 
banking system as a whole. A similar issue of 
systemic stability may also arise in connection 
with the new resolution framework when bail-in 
is applied before the start of resolution, as will 
be described.     
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The ensuing analysis concentrates on the mutual 
consistency of the two sets of rules, how they 
are coordinated and how they address the 
question of systemic stability when creditor 
claims are bailed in. It does not address the 
broader issue of the potential impact of bail-in 
on investors’ confidence under distressed 
market conditions, which is a feature of the 
current transition to full banking union; on this 
issue, readers may usefully refer to Avgouleas & 
Goodhart (2014). Our conclusion is that by and 
large the two sets of rules are mutually 
consistent and that they already contain 
sufficient safeguards to address systemic 
stability concerns when confronted with a single 
bank’s crisis (i.e. barring systemic banking 
crises). However, the sensitivity of investors to 
policy announcements in today’s still-fragile 
financial conditions may require further efforts 
to clarify state aid policy regarding prudential 
bank recapitalisations in the transition to the 
SSM. 
2. The role of state aid control in 
governing bank restructuring at 
EU level 
Since 2008, the European Commission has 
adopted a number of decisions under Articles 
107-109 TFEU on the compatibility of state aid 
measures in favour of banks. Article 107 leaves 
the Commission sufficient flexibility to adapt 
the state aid policy in trying times, by 
permitting it to be considered compatible with 
common market aid measures that appear 
necessary and proportionate in order to address 
market failures. In identifying the market 
failures specific to the financial crisis since 2008, 
the Commission had to proceed by trial and 
error. As it came to recognise the systemic 
nature of the crisis, it resorted, as a legal basis 
for the temporary adoption of exceptional 
measures, to Article 107, paragraph 3, letter b, of 
the Treaty, which allows the authorities to 
consider measures needed to “remedy a serious 
disturbance in the economy of a Member State” 
as compatible with the common market. It was 
understood that the standard criteria for the 
control of state aid would again be applicable 
once the financial system returned to normal 
conditions. 
Since 2008, the Commission has adopted seven 
Communications setting out the special criteria 
to be used in the assessment of the compatibility 
of state aid in the financial sector (the first 
Banking Communication of 2008 has been 
entirely replaced by the Communication of July 
2013; the others have been partially updated).4 
Initially, the emphasis was on state guarantees; 
it later shifted to recapitalization measures and 
the treatment of impaired assets. The three 2009 
Communications, predicated on the belief that 
the peak of the crisis was past, focussed on 
restructuring aid, based on three principles:  
i) The aid recipient must be viable in the long 
term, with no need for further aid.  
ii) Bank owners must contribute to 
restructuring costs (burden sharing).  
iii) The potential distortions of competition 
resulting from state aid must be kept to a 
minimum through adequate remedies 
(divestitures and behavioural measures, 
such as the prohibition of aggressive 
commercial conduct). In 2010, as funding 
                                                     
4  Communication from the Commission — The 
application of State aid rules to measures taken in 
relation to financial institutions in the context of the 
current global financial crisis (2008/C 270/02); 
Communication from the Commission — The 
recapitalization of financial institutions in the current 
financial crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum 
necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of 
competition (2009/C 10/03); Communication from the 
Commission on the treatment of impaired assets in the 
Community banking sector (2009/C 72/01); 
Commission Communication on the return to viability 
and the assessment of restructuring measures in the 
financial sector in the current crisis under the State aid 
rules (2009/C 195/04); Communication from the 
Commission on the application, from 1 January 2011, of 
State aid rules to support measures in favour of banks 
in the context of the financial crisis (2010/C 329/07); 
Communication from the Commission on the 
application, from 1 January 2012, of State aid rules to 
support measures in favour of banks in the context of 
the financial crisis (2011/C 356/02); and, finally, the 
“Banking Communication” of July 2013.  
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conditions normalised, the Commission 
tightened its requirements, notably by 
considering state aid for recapitalisation and 
impaired assets as compatible with the 
internal market conditional on the recipient 
submitting a restructuring plan.  
In general, the criteria set out in the Guidelines 
were applied flexibly, always with due 
consideration of each case-specific features. For 
example, whereas in HypoBank the 
Commission required a substantial dismissal of 
assets, in ABN Amro it only required the bank 
to abstain from aggressive commercial conduct, 
as the need for state aid was seen as unrelated to 
a need for restructuring. 
In 2011, financial conditions worsened again in 
the eurozone, with the emergence of a perverse 
‘doom loop’ between the sovereign and bank 
crises. The Commission reacted by extending 
the application of the crisis Communications. In 
its conclusions of 22 October 2011, the Ecofin 
Council acknowledged that state aid control 
represented the sole coordination instrument 
available at EU level to maintain financial 
stability and a level playing field in the internal 
market by encouraging distressed banks to 
restructure and return to viability.5  
In 2012, the European Council launched the 
banking union project, with the purpose of 
breaking the vicious circle between sovereign 
and bank debt, overcoming the fragmentation of 
financial markets and eradicating moral hazard 
by bankers through strengthened supervision, a 
new banking resolution procedure at EU level6 
and beefed-up deposit insurance rules. The 
Commission argued that, while waiting for the 
banking union to be established, it was still 
necessary for it to play a temporary role in order 
to ensure the orderly restructuring of the 
banking sector: in this sense, its 2013 
Communication can be seen as a transition, or 
‘bridge’, communication which will have to be 
                                                     
5  See European Commission, Report on Competition 
Policy 2011.  
6 See Micossi et al. (2013). 
adapted again to intervening changes in the 
banking regulatory framework.  
The Commission has always stressed that its 
overarching goal in the control of state aid in the 
financial sector is that of ensuring financial 
stability. This includes preventing spill-over 
effects that might result from the failure of a 
bank and ensuring that the banking system as a 
whole continues to provide adequate lending to 
the real economy, while minimising state aid 
and distortions of competition.  
In order to foster financial stability and ensure 
that resort to taxpayers’ resources for bailing out 
banks would in the future be minimised, the 
latest Guidelines require sufficiently timely and 
decisive restructuring plans to restore the bank 
to long-term viability or, as an alternative, its 
orderly wind-down. These restructuring plans 
will be assessed in close cooperation with the 
competent supervisory authorities; moreover, 
state aid will be authorised only subject to 
burden-sharing also involving junior creditors.  
Rescue aid before a restructuring plan is 
approved can only be admitted when the 
competent supervisory authority confirms that 
this is necessary to preserve financial stability. 
On the other hand, for banks not experiencing a 
capital shortfall, the main instrument for 
support should be guarantees on new liabilities. 
Recapitalisation or impaired assets measures 
will be deemed compatible only if the member 
state demonstrates that all attempts to minimise 
the need for state aid have been undertaken, 
notably by:  
i) submitting, before or as part of the 
restructuring plan, a capital raising plan 
(including issues of new rights, voluntary 
conversion of subordinated debt, asset sales, 
earnings retention);  
ii) changing management and applying strict 
executive remuneration policies until the 
end of the restructuring period;  
iii) preventing the outflow of own funds, 
among other things by restricting dividends, 
buy-backs of hybrid capital instruments, 
acquisitions, etc.; and 
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iv) ensuring adequate burden-sharing: losses 
should be first absorbed by equity; hybrid 
capital and subordinated debt holders must 
then contribute to reducing the capital 
shortfall to the maximum extent, through 
conversion or write-down of the principal of 
their instruments.  
The Communication envisages two scenarios for 
burden-sharing: i) the bank does not meet the 
minimum regulatory capital requirements or, ii) 
the minimum capital requirements are met and 
yet a capital shortfall is identified by a 
competent supervisory authority, e.g. as a result 
of a stress test (precautionary recapitalisations). 
In the first case, state aid can only be authorised 
after equity, hybrid capital and subordinated 
debt have fully contributed to covering the 
losses (through write-down or conversion). In 
the second case, the Commission indicates that 
if there are no alternative ways to remedy the 
shortfall, then in principle subordinated debt 
must be converted into equity before granting 
the state aid. The write-down of debt is not 
contemplated. This strengthened burden-
sharing, involving junior creditors, is the main 
novelty of the July 2013 Communication.  
During the crisis, burden-sharing involving 
creditors has been applied by some member 
states, e.g. in cases involving Irish, Dutch and 
Danish banks, and has been imposed by the 
Troika as a condition for access to financial 
assistance programmes in Spain and Cyprus.7 
After the adoption of the new Banking 
Communication, it has also been required by the 
Commission for approving state aid for the 
restructuring of the main banks in Slovenia.  
In order to ensure compatibility with the 
protection of property rights, the 
Communication endorses the ‘no creditor worse 
off’ principle (point 46): subordinated creditors 
should not receive less in economic terms than 
what their instrument would have been worth if 
no state aid had been granted. 
                                                     
7 For a general background to bail-in and a description 
of precedents, see DG Internal Market (2011), Financial 
Stability Board (FSB) (2011) and Dűbel (2013).  
For completeness, it may be recalled that state 
aid policy also places some constraints on 
Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) 
procedures by national central banks (under 
ECB control): Point 62 of the 2013 Banking 
Communication specifies in this regard that 
“dedicated support to a specific credit 
institution (commonly referred to as ELA) may 
constitute aid”, unless certain conditions are 
met. 8  In turn, ECB rules for ELA are fully 
consistent with those for state aid and, in 
addition, the ESCB Statute assigns the 
Governing Council the power to restrict such 
operations when they may “interfere with the 
objectives and tasks of the Eurosystem” (Article 
14.4). Since ELA normally does not constitute 
state aid, the application of burden-sharing and 
bail-in cannot come into play.  
3. Write-down and conversion in the 
resolution framework 
The objective of the BRRD and the SRR is to 
manage and resolve bank crises through 
common administrative procedures, whose 
application for member states participating in 
the SSM will be entrusted to a new EU 
authority, the Single Resolution Board (SRB). 
The resolution objectives are: to ensure the 
orderly unwinding of a bank that is failing, 
while preserving the continuity of critical 
functions (e.g. the payment system), protecting 
financial stability and depositors, as well as 
minimising reliance on extraordinary public 
financial support (Article 12 of the Regulation). 
This last provision is meant to bar any future 
public support of failing banks – from bail-out 
to bail-in – thus severing one link between 
                                                     
8 The credit institution, albeit temporarily illiquid, must 
be solvent; the liquidity provisions occur in exceptional 
circumstances and are not part of a larger aid package; 
the facility is fully secured by collateral with 
appropriate haircuts; the national central bank charges a 
penal interest rate; and the measure is taken at the 
central bank’s own initiative, without any counter-
guarantee of the state.      
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banking and sovereign risks.9  As may be seen, 
there is a significant overlap with the objectives 
of the 2013 Banking Communication.  
Under the “General Principles” for bail-in in 
Article 13 of the SRR (and in Article 34 of the 
BRRD), the shareholders of the institution under 
resolution will bear first losses; creditors will 
bear losses after them, in accordance with the 
reverse order of their priority claims under 
national insolvency law; and no creditor shall 
incur greater losses than would have been 
incurred if the entity had been wound up under 
normal insolvency proceedings (the ‘no creditor 
worse off’ condition10). Thus, the list of creditor 
claims that may be called in is broader than that 
under the 2013 Banking Communication, 
potentially extending to senior uncovered bonds 
and, down the line, uninsured deposits (those 
above €100,000, under the Deposit Insurance 
Directive). 
The SRB has the power to write down and 
convert liabilities of the credit institution both 
on a stand-alone basis and within a resolution 
procedure, by activating the bail-in tool. Article 
18 states that the write-down and conversion of 
capital instruments shall be exercised by the 
Board when: 
i) the entity would no longer be viable unless 
the capital instruments are written down or 
converted into equity; and  
ii) public aid is required by the entity or group, 
with the exceptions provided for by Article 
16.3.d (described below).  
When the exercise of the write-down and 
conversion powers is sufficient to recapitalise 
the bank, the Board may use them without 
placing the bank in resolution; otherwise, the 
write-down and conversion of capital 
instruments will take place within the resolution 
procedure, before any other resolution action is 
taken. 
                                                     
9  There is another link that remains, stemming from 
banks’ exposure to sovereign securities held in their 
balance sheet.  
10 Article 34.1.g of the BRRD. 
There are conditions for initiating a resolution 
procedure, according to Article 16 of the 
Regulation:  
i) the entity is failing or likely to fail; 
ii) there is no reasonable prospect that an 
alternative action (including the write-down 
or conversion under Article 18) would 
prevent its failure within a reasonable 
timeframe; or 
iii) a resolution action is necessary and 
proportionate in the public interest (as 
defined in Article 12) to ensure the 
continuity of critical functions, maintain 
financial stability, minimise the burden on 
public resources, and protect depositors and 
client funds and assets.  
The entity is deemed to be failing or likely to fail 
when one or more of a set of circumstances 
listed in paragraph 3 of Article 16 11  are met; 
amongst them stands the receipt of 
extraordinary public financial support (i.e. state 
aid). The determination of the condition (i) 
above shall be made by the ECB, after 
consulting the SRB; the SRB will decide on the 
presence of conditions (ii) and (iii). When this is 
the case, the SRB will adopt a resolution scheme 
detailing the use of resolution tools and that of 
the Fund, and send it to the Commission. The 
resolution scheme will enter into force if no 
objections have been raised by the Council or 
the Commission (on the grounds of public 
interest listed in Article 16 paragraph 6) within 
24 hours after transmission by the SRB of the 
scheme.  
As mentioned above, an escape clause in Article 
16.3.d provides that financial support to the 
bank by national authorities or the Fund does 
not imply that the institution is failing or is 
likely to fail, when it involves state guarantees 
to back liquidity facilities provided by central 
banks (Article 16.3.d.i), state guarantees of 
newly issued liabilities or recapitalisations 
(injections of own funds, Article 16.3.d.ii) or the 
purchase of capital instruments that do not 
                                                     
11 Paragraph 4 of Article 32 of the BRRD.  
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confer an advantage upon the entity (Article 
16.3.d.iii).12 The three exceptions only apply to 
solvent entities and, in any event, are 
conditional on approval under state aid rules. In 
practice, these measures shall be acceptable 
when they are of a precautionary and temporary 
nature and proportionate to remedy the 
consequences of a serious exogenous 
disturbance. The exception in Article 16.3.d.iii 
concerning recapitalisations is limited to capital 
shortfalls established following the stress tests, 
asset quality reviews or equivalent exercises.13  
In summary, if the entity requires state aid (with 
the exception of state guarantees and aid for 
recapitalisation at market prices, aimed at 
solvent companies), it is deemed to be failing or 
likely to fail and the Board may use its powers 
to write down and convert its liabilities (bail-in) 
when this is deemed necessary to achieve the 
public-interest objectives of the new rules. If a 
broader resolution action is needed, these 
powers will be exercised within the resolution 
procedure and may be associated with the use 
of other instruments (e.g. sale of business tool, 
bridge institution tool, or asset separation tool) 
and resort to the resolution Fund, as described 
by the resolution scheme prepared by the Board. 
The resolution scheme will enter into force only 
if no objection has been raised by either the 
Council or the Commission within 24 hours 
from its transmission by the Board. 
All of this is without prejudice to the application 
by the Commission of the state aid framework.14 
More specifically, the SRR provides that when 
public aid (either state aid or aid from the Fund) 
is present, the Board shall act in conformity with 
the decision on that public aid taken by the 
Commission.15 
                                                     
12 See also Article 32.4.of the BRRD.  
13 See also Article 32.4 of the BRRD.  
14 Article 44.12 of the BRRD.  
15 Article 16.8 of the SRR.  
4. Coordination of resolution 
procedures with state aid control 
Article 16a of the regulation coordinates the 
action of the Board relating to the resolution 
procedure (Article 16) and that of the 
Commission in the exercise of its powers for the 
control of state aid. Use of the Resolution Fund 
is treated as state aid and therefore is subject to 
prior control by the Commission under Article 
107 TFEU, with the same procedures. Although 
the resources of the SRF will be collected with 
fees charged on banks, they result from a 
compulsory contribution established by the law 
and therefore are treated as if they were public 
resources. The rationale for this provision is to 
ensure equal treatment of those member states 
participating in the SSM and those not 
participating when their banks are supported 
with public funds. 
Under Article 16a, when the resolution action 
involves the granting of public aid, the adoption 
by the Board of the resolution scheme “shall not 
take place until such time as the Commission 
has adopted a positive or conditional decision 
concerning the compatibility of the use of public 
aid with the internal market” under Article 107 
TFEU. The regulation recalls the principle of the 
BRRD (Article 3.3) whereby institutions should 
ensure the operational independence between 
their function in the resolution framework and 
other functions. For the Commission, this 
implies that the performance of the institutional 
tasks related to public aid control will have to be 
clearly separated, also from an organisational 
perspective, from the Commission tasks in 
vetting the SRB resolution proposal under 
Article 16 of the regulation.  
When the Board considers that resolution 
measures could constitute public aid, it will 
invite member states to notify the Directorate 
General for Competition of the European 
Commission, and it will directly notify 
measures involving the use of the Fund. If the 
Commission takes a negative decision on the 
compatibility of public aid, the Board will be 
obliged to reconsider its resolution scheme and 
revise it. It is also envisaged that the 
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Commission may amend its initial decision, 
following a recommendation by the Board or on 
its own initiative, if the implementation of 
resolution tools and actions departs from the 
criteria on the basis of which it has taken its 
original decision. This opens the way to the 
exercise of some flexibility, in the case of 
unforeseen developments related to financial 
stability. 
It is important also to recall that the 
Commission’s decisions on public aid will 
always be based on the resolution scheme 
prepared by the Board (which includes 
information on the exercise of bail-in powers). 
Therefore, its decisions, which will be taken 
under the state aid perspective, will not need to 
extend to the design of burden-sharing 
arrangements to be applied to shareholders and 
creditors. The Commission will only have to 
assess whether the proposal made by the Board 
under resolution rules satisfies the requirement 
of sufficient burden-sharing under state aid 
rules. While this may entail some room for 
discussion between the competition and 
resolution authorities, there seems to be no 
inherent contradiction.  
5. In conclusion: how to improve the 
public communication of 
competition policy goals  
Our analysis shows in the first place that the 
new resolution framework is fully consistent 
with state aid policy. Indeed, coordination of the 
two sets of provisions is explicitly provided for 
by the SRR, since all decisions entailing resort to 
public aid will be preliminarily vetted by the 
Commission under state aid rules, and the 
interaction between the two procedures is well 
designed. Once the SSM and the SRM are fully 
in force, the task of limiting moral hazard and 
the use of public funds through appropriate 
bail-in measures will plainly fall to the SRB, 
although the Commission may express its view 
in the exercise of its competences in the control 
of state aid. 
As to the relationship between bail-in under the 
two procedures and concerns of financial 
stability – meaning that the expectation or fear 
of a bail-in may trigger a run on a bank or the 
banking system by (uncovered) depositors and 
investors – the following conclusions apply. 
First, when a bank is failing or likely to fail and 
therefore likely to be placed under resolution, 
the essential requirement to preserve financial 
stability is speed of the decision, which under 
normal circumstances should take place within 
a weekend following the ECB communication 
that the relevant circumstances are met. Here, 
bail-in is just a particular component of the 
general process and does not seem to entail 
specific consequences or raise special concerns. 
As has been described, it is also possible for the 
resolution authorities to write down and convert 
unsecured liabilities into equity on a stand-alone 
basis; but again, this may only happen when the 
bank is no longer viable and therefore already is 
under special care by the resolution authorities. 
Therefore, a separate adverse impact of bail-in 
on investors’ expectations is not likely. 
Moreover, under the BRRD and SRR, bail-in is 
excluded for viable entities when public support 
is of a temporary and precautionary nature and 
is proportionate to remedy the consequences of 
a serious exogenous disturbance. 
Thus, the possibility of destabilising effects from 
fears of bail-in seems mainly to arise for solvent 
institutions in need of public support to raise 
capital, hence from the application of state aid 
rules. In this regard, the Banking 
Communication already contains a number of 
safeguards and exceptions that may help dispel 
these fears. These notably include the following:  
i) the provision that an exception can be made 
in cases where implementing the 
Communication would endanger financial 
stability or lead to disproportionate results 
(point 45);  
ii) the provisions specifying that when 
applying state aid rules to individual cases, 
the Commission shall take account of the 
macroeconomic environment; the 
specificities of each credit institution and 
each Member State; the circumstance that 
the need for state aid has not been the result 
BAIL-IN PROVISIONS IN STATE AID AND RESOLUTION PROCEDURES | 9 
 
of excessive risk-taking; the need of a 
coordinated approach when recapitalisation 
measures involve a wide share of the 
financial system, taking into consideration 
the aggregate effects of restructuring of 
individual institutions at the level of the 
sector and on the economy as a whole; and 
the feasibility of burden-sharing measures 
and their impact on market structure (points 
9-11); and 
iii) the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle, 
whereby subordinated creditors should not 
receive less in economic terms than what 
their instrument would have been worth if 
no state aid were to be granted (point 46).  
On the basis of these criteria, it is reasonable to 
expect that the prudential recapitalisation of a 
solvent bank, following a stress test, would not 
entail the risk of losses for junior creditors even 
where, due to general market conditions, there 
is a need for some temporary public support.  
However, this reassuring balance of the 
elements underpinning the Commission’s 
decisions in individual cases may not be clear to 
bank creditors and potential investors out there 
in financial markets. The impression that there is 
an unneeded rigidity on this very sensitive issue 
has been heightened by official statements over-
emphasising that each case under competition 
rules will be assessed individually, thus feeding 
the concern that the systemic dimension of the 
issue may have been underestimated. 
Therefore, some further clarification by the 
Commission may be needed on how the various 
criteria will be applied during the ongoing 
transition to banking union – perhaps through a 
new communication completing the state aid 
framework for banks in view of the adoption of 
the new resolution rules – without of course 
calling into question the principle that public aid 
has to be kept to a minimum, both for distressed 
banks and for banks that are fundamentally 
sound, and that the availability of public aid 
should not give rise to moral hazard and 
distortions of competition.  
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